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ALAN I. ROBBINS, STACY D. GOULD

Traditional Municipalization and
Duplication of Facilities Cases:
Background, Facts, and Status
GRAMMER KISSEL ROBBINS
SKANCKE & EDWARDS, WASHINGTON, D.C.
In connection with the University of New Mexico School of Law's
Symposium on Electric Industry Bypass Policy, we have been asked to
provide background on the facts and status of a number of "traditional"
municipalization efforts, including those which have involved duplication
of facilities. Additionally, we have been asked to provide the basic facts and
status on certain other bypass efforts that do not necessarily involve
municipalization of an electric system. This article briefly summarizes the
basic steps of municipalizing electric systems, sets forth some threshold
legal and factual issues arising from municipalization, and outlines some of
the recent efforts to bypass existing investor-owned utilities.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Overview

Municipalization refers generally to the process whereby a unit of
local government, most commonly a municipality, acquires ownership and
operational control of the electric distribution system serving the environs
in (and perhaps around) the municipality's corporate limits. In virtually
every case electric service prior to the municipalization effort is provided
by a regulated, investor-owned public utility. The impetus for municipalization is the pursuit of lower electric rates and, in some instances, improved
reliability of service.
Municipalizations occur most frequently in areas with high electric
rates. By creating a municipal electric system, the municipality becomes a
wholesale customer that can pursue lower cost bulk power supply from a
supplier other than the high-cost supplier that had been serving the city at
retail. Transmission service is of course necessary to enable the city to obtain
delivery of that lower cost power and energy from the alternate source. As
a wholesale electric customer, the city is entitled to such transmission
service under the open access transmission tariffs that regulated trans-
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mission owners are required to make available under the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC) Order No. 888.1
In Order No. 888, the FERC is requiring all public utilities that own,
control, or operate transmission facilities which transmit electricity in
interstate commerce to file with the FERC open access transmission tariffs.
In addition, the rule provides public utilities with the ability to recover
"stranded costs"2 associated with providing open access service? Prior to
Order No. 888, municipal wholesale customers were able to compel the
necessary transmission service either through negotiation or pursuant to the
antitrust laws.
The initial impetus for investigating the feasibility of municipalization can, and does, come from a variety of sources. Civic leaders may
urge the city to consider municipalization with the hope and expectation
that lower electric rates will enable the city to better retain existing business
and better compete for new business. Citizen groups, sometimes primarily
comprised of residential interests and sometimes of commercial interests,
can be the moving force. In other cases, one or two large industrial
customers, interested in economizing on their own electric rates, will initiate
4
municipalization efforts; unable to obtain "retail wheeling" or direct access,
the industrial customer can achieve much the same effect by becoming a
customer of a new municipal system that will in turn acquire lower cost
wholesale electric power supply.
B. Brief Summary of the Traditional Municipalization Process
In broad terms, the basic steps of a municipalization effort are
relatively straightforward. A city interested in municipalization will
ordinarily first conduct a preliminary feasibility study. This engineering
report will examine the economic feasibility of a municipalization effort in
order to determine whether the potential savings in power costs are likely
to exist at all and, if so, to what approximate extent. Such studies will often
consider the feasibility based both on acquisition of the existing distribution
system and construction of a new duplicative distribution system. Because
1. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discri-minatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, FERC Stats. & Reg. [Regs. Preambles) 31,036 (1996)[hereinafter
Promoting).
2. Stranded costs refers to a utility's investment in plants which it may not recover
because of the loss of sales as customers obtain the ability to buy power from another supplier.
3. Promoting, supra note 1.
4. The term "retail wheeling" (also referred to as "direct access") is used to describe the
scenario in which end-users (retail customers) have the freedom to choose their electric
supplier.
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municipalization efforts are typically expensive, both in monetary and
political capital, city leaders need to assess whether the matter is worthy of
pursuit.
A preliminary legal review is also ordinarily undertaken, either
before, during, or shortly following the preliminary feasibility study. This
legal review will typically examine threshold issues including the
municipality's authority under state law and effect of the present power
supplier's franchise to provide service in the municipality, status and effect
of pertinent contracts, if any, authority to obtain transmission service,
referenda requirements, the city's authority to takeover the existing
distribution system by way of condemnation, and various related financing
issues.
Assuming the city determines municipalization is feasible, the city
will then begin implementing the efforts. Depending on state law, a
referendum may be one of the first required steps in order to establish the
city's authority to proceed. This will often precipitate a substantial public
relations battle between the city and the existing retail service provider
wherein the city promotes the benefits of lower rates and the utility
attempts to discredit the city's assumptions. The city must arrange power
supply and transmission service. In most cases, the city will have to secure
transmission service from the retail supplier/transmission owner because
the city is likely to be interconnected with only that supplier. In some cases,
the geographic layout is such that the city may have the option of
constructing a new interconnection with a different transmission provider."
The city also must either take-over the distribution system (by negotiated
purchase or through litigated condemnation proceedings), or construct a
new system.
As a result of FERC Order No. 888, the city may also face claims by
the utility for stranded cost recovery, a topic in and of itself. It is too early
to tell with certainty whether, on balance, efforts to municipalize will be
helped or hindered by Order No. 888; open access should make the
acquisition of transmission service easier, but the stranded cost recovery
portions of Order No. 888 may well burden the effort with greater litigation
and, most obviously, may well alter the economic feasibility of a given
municipalization effort.
In the end, four key pieces must come together. (1)acquisition of the
distribution system, or construction of a new system; (2) alternative
wholesale power supply arrangements; (3) transmission arrangements; and

5. If there is another utility in the area, the city may be able to construct new
transmission facilities that physically connect the city's distribution system to that company's
transmission system.
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(4) financing. Because the utility that had been providing retail service to
the city is typically not a proponent of the municipalization effort, litigation
on any number of issues in any number of fora is common. Legal issues
raised in litigation will vary from case to case, but could include claims
under. (1) local procedural requirements; (2) condemnation laws; (3) public
bidding laws; (4) state regulatory laws; (5) state constitutional provisions
relative to utility and municipal matters; (6) financing-related laws; and (7)
FERC and other federal laws and policies relative to transmission service
and rates.
In 1922, government-owned electricity served 13 percent of the
population.6 Municipal ownership of electric systems peaked in 19237
From that point, municipal ownership declined as local governments sold
their distribution systems to private companies.' Some commentators
believe that municipalization efforts will boom again in the immediate
future.9 Because of Order No. 888's open-access provisions, municipal
systems will have greater opportunity to choose the utility from which they
will buy their power. This may enable municipals to reduce their costs,
thereby reducing their rates to consumers.10 Neighboring towns, seeing the
benefits of lower rates, may also pursue municipalization. However, as
explained, stranded cost recovery and protracted litigation will, at least to
some degree, frustrate municipalization efforts by limiting the potential cost
savings to the community.
C. Key Bypass Policy Issues Presented by Municipalization Efforts
Some of the more important issues presented by traditional
municipalization efforts include:
1. Can municipalization be considered a consequence of FERC's open
transmission access policies (i.e., Order No. 888) in view of the fact that
many municipalizations were successfully undertaken prior to adoption
of this policy (e.g., Massena, NY; Clyde, Ohio; Kanab, Utah)?

6.

Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins of Political Electricity: Market Failureor Political

Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY LJ. 59,67 (1996), (citing RALPH DIwsy, THE MUNICIPAL PLANT: Is IT
CoMiNG OR GoiNG?, Gov R(mENrOWNERSHIP oF PowE AND LIGHT UTIiEs) 59 (Claibome
Duval ed., 1934).
7. Id., (dting DAVID SC-AP, MuNICiPAL OWNERsmIP iN THE ELmc UTIIy INDUSTRY,
9,26(1986)).

8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Richard J.Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transitionto Competitive Markets in Natural
Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY LJ., 323, 345 (1994).
10.

See id. at 345-6.
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2. Does national policy favor competition on the wholesale level on an
unlimited basis and, if not, what are the appropriate limits under which
competition and customer choice should give way to other policy
considerations?
3. Need we be concerned about "sham" forms of municipalizations and,
if so, how are bona fide forms of municipalizations to be distinguished
from "sham" efforts?
4. Is duplication of facilities an acceptable price to pay, when necessary,
to enable municipalization bypass efforts to continue?
5. What will be the effect of FERC's policy on stranded cost recovery on
future municipalization efforts?
6. What will be the effect of retail wheeling/direct access laws on future
municipalization efforts?
7. What is the distinction between a "paper" or "partial" municipalization
and power marketers that own no generating or transmission facilities?
Every current and future effort at municipalization will face some
or all of these issues. As the regulatory environment evolves, new issues
will inevitably arise.
I.

ILLUSTRATIVE "TRADITIONAL" MUNICIPALIZATIONS

The following traditional municipalizations involve(d) efforts to
condemn the existing utility or duplicate facilities. Under the condemnation
approach, the city takes over the existing utility's facilities, and the existing
utility ceases to operate in the relevant market. Duplication, however, is the
process whereby the city constructs additional facilities which operate
alongside those of the existing utility.
A.

Massena, New York

Massena is a landmark case of municipalization in upstate New
York and is serving to motivate other towns in the region to municipalize.
The process in Massena, however, predated the EPAct, Order No. 888, and
current New York Condemnation Law. Massena's effort to municipalize
began in 1968 with an initial feasibility study which considered the costs
involved in condemning Niagara Mohawk's facilities." The initial study
and subsequent studies indicated that the net book value of Niagara

11. Wallace L Duncan, Massena, New York.The "Granddaddy" of Municipalizations, 6
1995 (paper presented at Infocast, Inc. conference, Sept. 21-22, 1995) [on file with author and
NAT. REs.J.].
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Mohawk's facilities was approximately $1.8 million.' The study
approximated the start-up costs to be under $4.5 million.13 In the end, the
process took 13 years14 and cost Massena $1.5 million in legal fees alone. 5
This was a battle of public relations. The voters initially approved the effort
in May, 1974.6 Following the vote, litigation ensued, which ultimately
lasted over six years.' 7
Some of the issues involved included: (1) whether Massena's change
in plan to take delivery from Niagara Mohawk's substations rather than
directly from the Power Authority of the State of New York (now the New
York Power Authority) invalidated the referendum; (2) valuation of
Niagara Mohawk's facilities; (3) whether Niagara Mohawk was required to
provide the town with transmission service; and (4) whether Niagara
Mohawk's refusal to provide transmission service violated antitrust laws.'8
The parties ultimately settled the litigation, with Niagara Mohawk agreeing
to wheel in Mohawk's two substations, service center, and distribution
facilities in surrounding towns for $7.7 million. 9 The town claims that the
rates have dropped by approximately 29 percent since municipalizing." The
Massena effort was concluded long before the industry entered the modem
restructuring era. Thus, Massena needed to obtain wheeling rights from
Niagara Mohawk, but was not confronted by the current rules regarding
stranded cost recovery nor by any prospect of New York's proposing
legislation establishing retail wheeling.
B. Glens Falls, New York
The municipalization effort in Glens Falls" was driven by
proponents' estimate that town municipalization could save the citizens
approximately 40-50 percent in rates over their current rates from Niagara
Mohawk based on a feasibility study commissioned by the local Industrial
Development Agency.2' Niagara Mohawk challenged this estimate, in part,
based on its claim that municipalization would leave the company with

12. Id.
13. Duncan, supra note 11, at 7.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7-8.
17. See id. at 10-19.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Grammer Kissel Robbins Skancke & Edwards is legal counsel to Glens Falls.
22. Glens Falls, N.Y. intrigued by the public power option, PuBLIc POWER WEEKLY, June 25,
1995, at 2.
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over $50 million in stranded costs.3 Niagara Mohawk argued that the
citizens would experience an increase in rates through municipalization.2'
Glens Falls had planned to issue industrial revenue bonds or Electric
System revenue bonds to raise capital for the project.2s Glens Falls
contemplated a traditional municipalization effort, including takeover of
the existing distribution system. Niagara Mohawk placed considerable
emphasis on stranded cost claims. Glens Falls held a referendum in
November, 1996.26 The referendum did not pass, thereby defeating the
effort to create a municipal system.
C. Franklin and St. Lawrence Counties
Many towns in these upstate New York counties are exploring
municipalization. Eight towns in this area in upstate New York have
recently passed referenda approving municipalization, five by large
margins. ' The towns are motivated to lower electric rates to their
consumers compared to Niagara Mohawk's rates. The residential rate is
currently 12 cents/kwh.2S Massena, in contrast, pays a rate of approximately
four cents.' The effort is backed by an independent power producer located
in Houston, the "Wing Group". 3° John Wing, the CEO of the Wing Group,
is a native of Norfolk, one of the towns which passed a referendum.3 The
Wing Group has offered to front the costs of municipalization, including
feasibility studies, engineering, and legal expenses.
Assuming the towns municipalize, they will repay the outlay
through bonds representing the out-of-pocket costs plus interest at the
prime rate or, in the alternative, the towns will provide the Wing Group
with 33 percent of the savings from reductions in rates. 32 Additionally, the
Wing Group will, over 15 years, receive a fee per kwh sold, not greater than
50 percent of the savings in any quarter. 3 An additional 11 towns have

23. Id.
24. PuBuc POWER WEEKLY, supra note 22, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Glens Falls looking to leave Nimo's grid,CAPITAL DISTIcr BUSINESS REVIEW, June 19-25,
1995, at 1.
27. Coopers & Lybrand, Electric Municipalization Review 26 (1996) [hereinafter
"Coopers").

28. Louisvillejoins public powoer movement in New York, PuBLIc POWER WEEKLY, March 11,
1996, at 3.

29. id.
30. Coopers, supranote 27, at 25.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 26.
33. Id.
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signed letters of intent to work with the Wing Group.' Niagara Mohawk
has argued that the towns will not save through municipalization because,
inter alia, they will face high stranded costs, which were not likewise
recoverable in the case of Massena.? As is the case with respect to Glens
Falls, the municipalities in Franklin and St. Lawrence Counties will need to
confront Niagara Mohawk's claims for stranded cost recovery, as well as
the possibility of retail wheeling at some future date.'
A further issue in New York is Niagara Mohawk's proposal entitled
"PowerChoice," which it filed with the New York Public Service
Commission in October, 1995.3 The plan represents an attempt by Niagara
Mohawk to restructure in a manner which will enable the company to
reduce its rates. A distinction between the Glens Falls effort and the Wing
Group's approach arises from the Wing Group's proposal to its clients to
municipalize on something of a turnkey basis, with its payback drawn from
the savings to be achieved. In contrast, Glens Falls is currently pursuing a
more traditional approach in that it is assuming the up-front costs and risks
and thus will retain the full benefit of savings for the city and its residents.
11.
A.

DUPLICATION OF FACILITIES

Aberdeen, New Jersey

Aberdeen sought to duplicate Jersey Central Power & Light's
("Jersey Central") distribution system, but the town defeated the
referendum by a margin of 6 to 1.' Aberdeen sought duplication rather
than traditional municipalization based on New Jersey's Condemnation
Law, which imposes a fair market value valuation methodology. The
township also preferred to avoid lengthy litigation.' ° Aberdeen sought to
reduce rates by at least 12 percent Jersey Central's rates are approximately
15 cents/kwh in the Summer and 12 cents in the Winter.' The impetus for
duplication came from Anchor Glass, the major industrial customer located

34. Id.
35. Coopers, supra note 27, at 26.
36. The staff of the New York Public Service Commission has recommended that retail
wheeling go into effect in New York by 1998. The New York State Senate has also considered
legislation by Senator Johnston, which proposed a start date in 2010. Coopers, supra note 23,
at 28.
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Telephone Interview with counsel for Aberdeen (July 11, 1996).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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in Aberdeen.' Jersey Central made Anchor Glass two offers to stunt the
process, but Anchor rejected both. The first would save Anchor $1.7 million,
but Anchor did not agree to the risk tied to the plan, which provided for a
minimum of 208 hours of interruption." The second provided for a buythrough of the interruptions and for $1 million in savings, but Anchor
would be bound to Jersey Central and could not seek to municipalize
Aberdeen for five years." Anchor rejected this offer because it did not have
the authority to bind the city." Despite Aberdeen's belief that stranded costs
could be minimized because: (1) state law precludes exclusive franchises
and (2) Aberdeen intended to secure transmission from an alternate
supplier, the township could not persuade its citizens to vote in favor of the
referendum. 7 Anchor subsequently closed its business operations in
Aberdeen.'
B. Clyde, Ohio
From 1893 to 1965, Clyde owned and operated its own municipal
system.' Clyde then sold its system to Toledo Edison, which served Clyde
principally until 1989, at which time, in contrast to Aberdeen, Clyde
completed a duplication of facilities.' Clyde originally contemplated
traditional municipalization, but changed its position in response to Toledo
Edison's legal argument that Clyde would owe for "generation rendered
useless.""' Toledo Edison's argument was the precursor to stranded
investment. Toledo Edison estimated this figure to be approximately $40
million.' Clyde did not want to incur such costs in addition to $3.5 million,
its estimate for the value of Toledo Edison's distribution facilities.
Furthermore, Clyde wanted to avoid litigation. The citizens voted in favor
of duplication in 1987, in part, because Whirlpool, the largest industrial
customer in Clyde, endorsed the project. Duplication cost Clyde
approximately $5 million.3 Clyde avoided "stranded costs" because its

43. Coopers, supra note 27, at 21.
44. Coopers, supra note 27, at 21. Interruption means that the utility discontinues its
service for a discrete amount of time.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Telephone Interview with counsel for Clyde (July 11,1996).
48. Coopers, supra note 27, at 23.
49. Clyde, Ohio begins servingfirst customer, PUBLIc POwEt WEEKLY, April 24,1989, at 7.
50. Id.
51. Gregg D. Ottinger, "Municipalization in the Electric Power Industry.The Case Study
of Clyde Ohio," 15-16 (1996) paper presented to Infocast, Inc. conference, (Feb. 29-Mar. 1,1996).
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 15-16.
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efforts predate the modem era and, in any event, Clyde now receives
transmission from Ohio Power rather than Toledo Edison.5 Clyde's rates
are reported to be around 25 percent lower than Toledo Edison's rates.5
Since municipalization, Toledo Edison has lost 95 percent of its load in
Clyde.%'
IV. CONCLUSION
Order No. 888 will likely send conflicting messages to local
governments which are considering municipalization. On the one hand,
government-owned electric systems will be able td shop for cheaper power,
thereby enabling them to reduce expenses; on the other hand, existing
utilities will pursue aggressively claims for stranded costs. Ultimately, the
future of municipalization will hinge on the individual circumstances in
each case. Towns considering municipalizing their electric systems will
have to perform a cost benefit analysis to determine whether the effort, in
the end, will provide the community with lower electric rates. If the city's
liability for stranded cost payments outweighs the savings that otherwise
would be achieved, the city will be more likely to forego municipalizing its
electric system.
The apparent advent of retail wheeling or direct access will
complicate the analysis. In some cases, adoption of state law mandating
direct access will make "traditional" bypass efforts either unnecessary or
more difficult. In other cases, savings will still be achievable through
municipal operation of the distribution (local delivery) service that remains
a key component of total electric service even in an age of direct access. The
core message that appears to be universal is that competitive forces will not
in the end allow themselves to be stifled.

54. See Coopers, supra note 27, at 43.
55. Ottinger, supra note 51, at 23.
56. See Coopers supra note 27, at 43.

